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Unlike standard models of choice, experimental evidence suggests
that individuals avoid tradeoffs between characteristics at complex
multi-attribute choice problems. I propose a market model in which
consumers are able to make tradeoffs up to a certain extent and firms
design multi-attribute products and influence attribute salience via
marketing. The main result is that moderate tradeoff avoidance re-
duces consumers’ welfare, only if attribute salience is manipulated by
firms. Therefore, if a policy-maker can effectively regulate marketing
campaigns, which typically concur in determining attribute salience,
and consumers are able to make at least one tradeoff, then the welfare-
maximizing outcome is achievable.
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1 Introduction
Unlike standard models of choice, experimental evidence suggests that the
decision-maker (DM) avoids tradeoffs between attributes at relatively com-
plex problems.1 A choice procedure according to which the DM makes trade-
offs between attributes is called compensatory and a procedure according to
which the DM avoids tradeoffs is noncompensatory (Payne, Bettman and
Johnson, 1993). The intuition behind this experimental finding is that per-
forming a tradeoff is a complicated cognitive operation that requires a cer-
tain amount of effort (Shafir, Simonsons and Tversky, 1993). A tradeoff in a
multi-attribute choice problem occurs whenever an alternative x (e.g. a Fiat
Chrysler Automobiles 500) is better in some dimension (design) than an al-
ternative y (a Toyota Yaris) and alternative y is better than alternative x in
some other dimension (performance). Whenever a choice problem involves
too many tradeoffs between attributes, the DM tends to rely on noncompen-
satory choice heuristics, such as the lexicographic and satisficing procedure,
that are less accurate, but require relatively less cognitive effort.
Investigating the implication tradeoff-avoiding consumers in a competi-
tive market is key for at least two reasons. First, it leads to economically
relevant questions, such as does tradeoff avoidance affect the market out-
come? How does the market outcome change if the number of tradeoffs
consumers are able to make increases? What kind of policy interventions are
needed, if any? Second, addressing this research question complements the
growing literature on complexity and market competition (Spiegler, 2015).
In this work I propose a quality-competition model in which firms design
multi-attribute products and advertise some attributes to maximize market
1See for example Payne, Bettman and Johnson (1993); Hauser, Ding and Gaskin (2009);
Gigerenzer, Hertwig and Pachur (2011).
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shares. The consumer is assumed to be boundely rational in the sense that
he is able (or willing) to make up to a certain number of tradeoffs between
attributes (captured by an exogenous parameter τ). If the menu of avail-
able products entails too many tradeoffs, the consumer chooses by focusing
his attention on a subset of salient attributes that are determined by firms’
marketing strategies. If even by then, the decision is too complicated, the
consumer chooses nothing (he post-pones). I assume that firms are con-
strained in the design of products by the technology (e.g. a car cannot have
a very powerful engine and at the same time low emissions) and are endowed
with a simple linear cost function.
I first consider a benchmark case in which the consumer is able to make
any number of tradeoffs (i.e., τ = +∞ or no tradeoff avoidance) and then
focus my attention on extreme (τ = 0) and moderate (τ = 1) tradeoff avoid-
ance. Throughout I assume costs to be small in order to focus on the market
implications of the consumer’s choice procedure leaving aside any other ef-
fect. The proposed analysis is restricted to symmetric equilibria and all the
derived equilibrium properties are shown to be unique.
I find that tradeoff avoidance affects product design, marketing, con-
sumers’ welfare, and product differentiation. Under extreme and moderate
tradeoff avoidance, firms design ‘extreme’ products and target marketing ac-
cordingly in equilibrium, even though consumers are endowed with convex
preferences. The intuition is that by designing a ‘balanced’ product and ad-
vertising accordingly, a firm incurs in the risk that the opponent designs a
product that induces an unaffordable number of tradeoffs in order to acti-
vate its marketing. The opponent targets marketing to a set of attributes for
which its product is utility-superior in such a way that choice avoidance is
prevented and has therefore an incentive to decrease the value of the char-
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acteristics that are not advertised, as they are not considered to be salient
by the consumer. This allows the opponent to save costs and obtain at least
the same market shares of the other firm, making its strategy a profitable
deviation. Competitive forces then induce firms to increase the quality of
the advertised attributes to the technological frontier in a Bertrand fashion.
By iterating this argument, the outcome is that firms have an incentive to
design more and more extreme products and target marketing accordingly.
The extent to which the designed products are extreme depends on the
consumer’s sophistication level. As the number of tradeoffs the consumer is
able to make increases, firms are incentivized to progressively design more
balanced products, as the above effects are mitigated. Marketing is targeted
in such a way that consumers never find difficult to compare two products
by considering the advertised attributes. E.g. if τ = 0, then in equilib-
rium firms advertise one attribute. By considering one attribute at a time,
no tradeoffs are generated and consumers actively choose at any realization
of the equilibrium. This implies that choice avoidance never occurs and
tradeoff avoidance does not reduce firms’ profits regardless of the consumer’s
sophistication level. In equilibrium marketing is effective in the sense that
conditional on a firm advertising some attributes, when those attributes are
considered to be salient, then the consumer buys the products offered by that
firm with probability one.
Tradeoff avoidance induces also product differentiation even though pref-
erences are assumed to be homogeneous. This is a consequence of the fact
that firms offer extreme products in equilibrium. If a firm does not include
in its bundle a product that excels in some dimensions, then the opponent
can profitably deviate by heavily specializing in those dimensions and ad-
vertising accordingly. However, the amount of product differentiation is not
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monotonic in the consumer’s sophistication level. That is, there is more
product differentiation under moderate than under extreme tradeoff avoid-
ance (under no-tradeoff avoidance there is none). This is because in the τ = 1
case there are more combinations of attributes that do not induce difficult
choices relative to the τ = 0 case.
In terms of welfare the products offered under moderate and extreme
tradeoff avoidance are worse than the welfare-maximizing one offered in the
benchmark case. The reason is that the consumer is endowed with convex
preferences, but firms offer extreme products in equilibrium. However, as the
consumer’s level of sophistication increases, the products offered in equilib-
rium are more balanced and therefore ‘closer’ to the optimum. Firms’ profits,
on the other hand, are unaffected by tradeoff avoidance, because the prod-
ucts and the marketing strategies are designed in such a way that difficult
choices and, as a result, choice avoidance are prevented.
The main result is that tradeoff avoidance does not reduce the consumer’s
welfare as long as attribute salience is exogenous and the consumer is able
to make at least one tradeoff (τ ≥ 1). This result is non-obvious, as the con-
sumer’s choice behaviour is shown to be irrational from a revealed-preference
viewpoint even when the set of considered attributes is exogenously imposed.
Competitive forces incentivize firms to move towards the optimum by chang-
ing at most two attributes at a time in such a way that the consumer’s
choice problem is never too complicated and choice avoidance is prevented.
A first consequence of this result is that when salience is exogenous firms
are weakly better off in the case in which the consumer is able to make at
least one tradeoff compared to the case in which he is able to make none.
A second consequence is that the speed at which the equilibrium can be
reached (in terms of number of deviations) from a non-equilibrium strategy
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profile is positively related with the number of tradeoffs the consumer is able
to make. The policy implication of this result is that policy-makers should
devote more attention to the regulation of marketing campaigns, which typi-
cally contribute to determine attribute salience, than to the challenging task
of educating moderately unsophisticated tradeoff-avoiding consumers. The
reason is that as long as consumers are able to make at least one tradeoff and
the policy-maker can influence what attributes are considered, then compet-
itive forces imply that the welfare-maximizing outcome can be achieved in
equilibrium.
In the remaining of this paper I discuss the related literature in section 2,
formalize the market model and discuss some choice-theoretic implications
of the consumer’s choice procedure in section 3, propose the equilibrium
analysis in section 4, investigate the effects of exogenous salience in section
5, and discuss limitations and extensions in section 6. All omitted proofs are
relegated in the appendix.
2 Related Literature
This paper is mainly related to the literature on behavioural IO.2 As dis-
cussed in the introduction, this paper complements the literature on com-
plexity and market competition Spiegler (2015). Bordalo, Gennaioli and
Shleifer (2015) investigate the effects of salience in an IO setting by assuming
that salience is menu-dependent. Dahremoeller and Fels (2015), on the other
hand, investigate product design in a monopolistic market by assuming that
consumers have limited attention following Gabaix (2014)’s sparsity-based
model of choice. Unlike these models, mine considers a competitive mar-
2E.g. see Armstrong (2008) for a policy-focused survey and Spiegler (2011) for a more
theoretical literature review.
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ket and assumes that the salient attributes are determined by marketing,
a separate firm’s decision. Bachi and Spiegler (2014) propose a model in
which firms offer a two-attribute product and consumers completely avoid
tradeoffs and resolve them by selecting a default option, when feasible, or,
alternatively, by considering only one random attribute when choosing the
default is not possible. On the contrary, I assume that consumers are able
(or willing) to make tradeoffs up to certain extent and marketing determines
what attributes are considered. Finally, Papi (2014) investigates a Stack-
elberg model in which consumers simplify a complex problem by using a
noncompensatory heuristic and firms influence the salient attribute via mar-
keting and attributes are binary. On the contrary, I assume that complexity
is aligned with the number of tradeoffs and not with cardinality, firms play
a simultaneous game, and attributes are not binary.
This work is also related to Koszegi and Szeidl (2013) that propose a
model in which the DM pays relatively more attention to salient attributes,
where an attribute salience is proportional to the range across alternatives
of that attribute value. Unlike Koszegi and Szeidl (2013), I assume that
‘focusing’ is determined by firms’ marketing strategies, does not occur at
problems that involve relatively few tradeoffs, and is not correlated with the
range of attribute values.
3 A Market Model
Let I = {1, . . . , A} denote a finite grand set of attributes with A > 2. Define
X ≡ ×Aa=1[0,+∞) to be a multi-attribute grand set of alternatives. A multi-
attribute product x = (x1, . . . , xA) is an element of X, where xa is product
x’s value of attribute a. E.g. x can be interpreted as a car, where attribute
one is maximum speed, attribute two is emissions, and so on. I say that
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there is tradeoff between two distinct attributes a, b ∈ I at a binary menu
{x, y} ⊆ X whenever xa > ya and yb > xb. As an example, given two cars
x and y, there is a tradeoff between speed and emissions if x’s maximum
speed is 150mph and y’s is 140mph and x pollutes more than y. Given a
binary menu {x, y} ⊆ X and a non-empty set of attributes J ⊆ I, I define
the set of tradeoffs Tr({x, y}; J) in J at choice problem {x, y} as the set
of pairs of conflicting attributes in J at {x, y}. Formally, Tr({x, y}; J) ≡
{(a, b) ∈ J2|a < b and there is a tradeoff between a and b at {x, y}}. The
number of tradeoffs in J at choice problem {x, y} is the number of elements
in Tr({x, y}; J).3 I sometimes refer to ({x, y}, J) as an extended choice
problem.
I assume that there are two profit-maximizing firms in the market that
compete for one consumer.4 A firm strategy is a pair (x,M) where x ∈ X
is a product and M ⊆ I is interpreted as the (non-empty) set of advertised
attributes. I refer to (x,M) as an extended product. The cost c(x,M) of
offering (x,M) is given by the summation ϕ
∑
a∈I xa, where ϕ > 0 is the
marginal cost of ‘producing’ attribute value xa and marketing is costless.
For simplicity, I assume that firms are endowed with a linear technology that
induces the constraint
∑
a∈I xa ≤ k, for some finite k. In the car case, for
example, horsepower and fuel consumption are directly related. Hence, by
the technology, firms cannot produce a fuel-efficient car with an extremely
powerful engine. I also assume that if the consumer buys firm i’s product,
firm i’s profits are £1 minus the production costs. Throughout I restrict my
attention to symmetric equilibria. Mixed strategies will play a relevant role
3Let h be the number of attributes in J . If h is even (resp., odd), the maximum number
of tradeoffs is h
2
4 (resp.,
h2−1
4 ) at the binary menu {x, y}.
4An equivalent interpretation is that there is a continuum of consumers in the interval
[0, 1].
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in the equilibrium analysis. I denote a symmetric mixed strategy by σ and
its support by S(σ).
The consumer is assumed to be boundedly rational in the sense that
he is able to perform up to a certain number of tradeoffs captured by the
parameter τ ≥ 0. Let {x, y} be the set of products offered by firm i and
firm j. I say that a set of attributes M ⊆ I is calibrated at the binary menu
{x, y} whenever |Tr({x, y},M)| ≤ τ . That is, by considering the attributes
in M the consumer faces at most τ ≥ 0 tradeoffs at the binary menu {x, y}.
I assume that if the grand set of attributes I is calibrated at {x, y}, then the
consumer considers all attributes in making his decision. On the contrary, if
the grand set of attributes I is not, then marketing influences the consumer
in the following way.
Let ((x,M), (y,N)) be a strategy profile. Assume first that the marketing
strategy M is calibrated at {x, y} and the marketing strategy N as well.
If both firms advertise O = M = N , then the set of attributes that the
consumer considers is O. If firms advertise different attributes M 6= N ,
then there are two equally likely states of the world: one in which the set
of attributes that the consumer considers is M and the other in which the
attributes in N are considered. I also assume that if M is not calibrated at
{x, y}, then the consumer chooses nothing in the state of the world in which
he considers firm i’s set of advertised attributes. If both firms marketing
strategies are not calibrated the consumer chooses nothing and both firms
obtain zero market shares.
The last bit is to introduce the consumer’s choice rule. Let u(x1, . . . , xA)
be a strictly increasing and strictly quasi-concave utility function.5 Sup-
pose that the set of considered attributes M is some subset of the grand
5That is, preferences are strictly convex. Formally, given x, y ∈ X, if x 6= y and x is at
least as good as y, then αx+ (1− α)y is strictly preferred over y for any α ∈ (0, 1).
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set of attributes I. I assume that the consumer chooses by maximizing
the ‘restricted’ function u|M(x), i.e., by considering only the attributes in
M . E.g. let I ≡ {a, b, c} and u(x) = (xρa + xρb + xρc)
1
ρ with 0 6= ρ < 1.
If the set of considered attributes is {a, b}, then the consumer maximizes
u|{a,b}(x) = (xρa + xρb)
1
ρ . I assume that the properties of the unrestricted util-
ity function (u(·) being strictly increasing and strictly quasi-concave) are pre-
served under domain restriction. Whenever I make welfare comparisons I use
the ‘unrestricted’ utility function u(x). Whenever I solve a utility maximiza-
tion problem, I assume an interior solution whenever feasible.6 Everything
is common knowledge and ties are randomly broken.
An interpretation of the model is as follows. Assume that a consumer
needs a new car. Suppose that Toyota and Fiat Chrysler Automobiles (FCA)
design a new car each, say Yaris and 500, respectively, and advertise some of
their characteristics. Assume that Toyota advertises comfort and reliability
and FCA design and performance. Due to the massive marketing campaign,
the advertised characteristics become salient attributes and the strong points
that identify the two models in the consumer’s mind. The characteristics of
the two cars are easily accessible by visiting the Toyota and FCA’s websites
(i.e., they are public information). The consumer compares the two models
(online or by visiting the car dealers) by briefly going over their character-
istics. If it is relatively easy for the consumer to figure out which car is the
best according to his preferences (i.e., tradeoffs are a few or they are easily
resolved), he goes for the most preferred one. On the contrary, if it is difficult
to determine which car is the best (i.e., there are too many tradeoffs), the
6I will sometimes look for the utility-maximizing alternative among corner solutions.
In those cases I assume the most interior solution. E.g. suppose that the consumer has
to solve maxx1,...,xa u(x1, . . . , xa, 0, . . . , 0) subject to some constraint. Then I assume the
solution to be x∗ ∈ X such that x∗1, . . . , x∗a are all strictly positive.
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consumer makes the comparison by considering the salient attributes only
(i.e., the advertised characteristics). If even by then, the consumer is unable
to determine the winner, because it is too complicated, he post-pones his
decision.
3.1 Choice-Theoretic Comments on the Consumer’s
Choice Procedure
Salant and Rubinstein (2008) propose a choice-theoretic model in which the
DM’s choice is a pair (S, f), where S is the set of available alternatives and
f some additional information about the choice problem called frame. Many
choice procedures (including the one that I propose here) can be formalized by
using the choice-with-frames framework. For example, f can be interpreted
as the ordering according to which the DM examines alternatives in S or a
status-quo option.7
In my model the consumer’s extended choice problem has two components
as well: a feasible set of two alternatives {x, y} and a set of considered at-
tributes M . It is therefore possible to define the consumer’s choice procedure
in terms of choice with frames by assuming that, for each extended choice
problem ({x, y},M), the frame M identifies what attributes are considered
by the consumer.
Remark 1. The consumer’s choice behaviour is irrational across frames.
Assume that x = (1, 2, 0, 3), y = (0, 0, 2, 0), w = (2, 1, 1, 1), and τ =
1. Consider the following two extended choice problems: ({x, y}, {3}) and
({y, w}, {1, 2, 3}). Both extended choice problems are not ‘easy choices’ as
the number of tradeoffs induced by considering all attributes is at least two.
7See Rubinstein and Salant (2006) for an example of choice from lists and Apesteguia
and Ballester (2009) for an example of choice with a reference point.
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In the first case the consumer chooses y, as he considers attribute 3 only and
y is better than x. In the second case the set of considered attributes is not
calibrated, as the number of tradeoffs induced is more than one. Hence, the
consumer chooses nothing. This constitutes a violation of rationality.
Remark 2. The consumer’s choice behaviour is irrational by keeping the
frame fixed.8
Consider x and y defined above and z = (1, 2, 3, 0). Assume that τ = 1
and the consumer considers attribute four to be more important than at-
tribute three. Suppose that the consumer has to solve the extended choice
problems ({x, y}, {3}), ({y, z}, {3}), and ({x, z}, {3}). Notice that at ({x, y}, {3})
the consumer chooses y, as explained above. Next, note that ({y, z}, {3})
is not an easy choice, as the number of tradeoffs is more than one. The
consumer considers attribute 3 only and therefore chooses z. Finally, the
extended choice problem ({x, z}, {3}) is an easy choice, as there is only one
tradeoff. Since attribute four is more important than attribute three, then
the consumer chooses x. This choice behaviour is cyclical and therefore irra-
tional.
4 Equilibrium Analysis
4.1 No Tradeoff Avoidance: τ =∞
Since τ =∞, then the consumer is fully rational, as he can handle any num-
ber of tradeoffs. This implies that marketing is irrelevant for any strategy
profile and firms have an incentive to raise the qualities of the supplied prod-
ucts in a Bertrand fashion. The characteristics of the products offered in
equilibrium depend entirely on the consumer’s choice rule.
8In Salant and Rubinstein (2008)’s words this translates into the choice function not
being a salient consideration function.
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Proposition 1 (No Tradeoff Avoidance). Assume that costs are sufficiently
small. Then, in the unique symmetric equilibrium firms offer x∗ ≡ arg maxx∈X u(x)
subject to
∑
a∈I xa ≤ k. Firms’ equilibrium profits are 12 − ϕk.
Proof. By the strict quasi-concavity of the utility function and the linearity of
the constraint, the solution to the problem maxx∈X u(x) subject to
∑
a∈I xa ≤
k exists and is unique. Denote it by x∗. It is easy to see that offering x∗ is
a pure-strategy equilibrium. Assume by contradiction that there is another
symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium σ different from x∗. Let y 6= x∗ be a
product in the support of σ. Then, x∗ yields higher market shares than y
does against itself and any other product in the support. As long as costs
are sufficiently small, it is profitable to replace y with x∗, a contradiction.
Hence, the equilibrium is unique.
In the benchmark case firms offer the unique optimal product x∗, mar-
keting is irrelevant, and firms’ equilibrium profits are 1
2
− ϕk.
4.2 Extreme Tradeoff Avoidance: τ = 0
I define an easy choice to be an extended choice problem ({x, y}, I) such
that |Tr({x, y}, I)| ≤ τ . That is, the number of tradeoffs between two alter-
natives is acceptable to the consumer by considering all attributes. Whenever
a choice is not easy, marketing plays an active role in determining which at-
tributes are considered and a sub-optimal decision can be made as illustrated
in the choice-theoretic subsection. In the τ = 0 case an easy choice is equiv-
alent to x and y being either Pareto related or the same (i.e., x = y).
I begin with a preliminary result.
Lemma 1. Assume that costs are sufficiently small. Then, the game that
models the market under consideration does not possess pure-strategy equi-
libria.
Proof. Suppose not. Assume that firms offer (x,M) with probability one.
Equilibrium market shares are 1
2
for each firm, as there is no choice avoidance.
Assume first that x does not lie on the technological frontier. Then, a firm
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can profitably deviate by offering a Pareto-superior alternative. Next, assume
that x lies on the frontier. Hence, it costs ϕk. Let γ = min{xa|a ∈ I}.
Assume that a firm deviates to (y, {b}), where b ∈ arg mina∈I{xa} and yb =
γ+ with  > 0 and yc = 0 for any c ∈ I \{b}. This deviation yields 12 market
shares. As long as  is sufficiently small, costs are lower than ϕk implying
that the deviation is profitable, a contradiction.
By standard Bertrand arguments, in equilibrium all products offered with
positive probability lie on the technological frontier. The reason is that,
as long as costs are sufficiently small, it is profitable to replace a Pareto-
dominated product with a Pareto-dominating one, because the comparison
between Pareto-related products does not induce any tradeoff. Moreover, a
Pareto superior product does not do worse than the Pareto dominated one
against the other products in the support. The full proof of this argument
can be found in the appendix.
The next lemmas characterize the products offered in equilibrium and the
marketing strategies.
Lemma 2. Assume that costs are sufficiently small and let σ be a symmetric
equilibrium strategy. Then, for all a ∈ I there exist an extended product
(x,M) in the support of σ such that xa = k and xb = 0 for any b ∈ I \ {a}.
Proof. Let s ≡ max{ya|y ∈ S(σ)} for some a ∈ I. Assume, by contradiction,
that s < k. Expected market shares in symmetric equilibrium cannot exceed
1
2
. Since products lie on the technological frontier, then expected profits in
symmetric equilibrium cannot exceed 1
2
− ϕk. Suppose that a firm deviates
to (x, {a}) such that xa = s + , where  ∈ (0, k − s), and zb = 0 for
any b ∈ I \ {a}. This deviation yields at least 1
2
− ϕ(s + ) > 1
2
− ϕk, a
contradiction.
Lemma 3. Assume that costs are sufficiently small and let σ be a symmetric
equilibrium strategy. Then, if xa = k and xb = 0 for any b ∈ I \ {a}, then
M = {a}.
Proof. Let (x,M) be an extended product in S(σ) such that xa = k and
xb = 0 for any b ∈ I \ {a} and M 6= {a}. By lemma 2, (y,N) such that
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yb = k and yc = 0 for any c ∈ I \{b} belongs to S(σ). I now show that (x,M)
does not yield greater market shares than (x, {a}) against σ. I distinguish
several cases.
Case (i): a /∈M . The result follows immediately.
Case (ii): {a, b} ⊆ M . Note that while (x, {a}) beats (y,N) in the
state of the world in which the considered attribute is a, (x,M) fails to do
so in the state of the world in which the set of considered attribute is M ,
as M is not calibrated. Moreover, note that in the other realizations of the
equilibrium (x,M) cannot do better than (x, {a}). This implies that (x, {a})
yields strictly greater market shares than (x,M) at the same cost, which is
the desired result.
Lemma 2 and lemma 3 say that firms offer ‘extreme’ products with pos-
itive probability and target marketing accordingly. In the appendix I show
that such extreme products actually are the only products offered with pos-
itive probability in equilibrium. The main idea is that if a firm offers a
‘balanced’ product and advertises accordingly, then the opponent has an in-
centive to design a product that induces at least one tradeoff in order to ‘ac-
tivate’ its marketing. The opponent targets marketing to a set of attributes
for which its product is superior and designs it in such a way that choice
avoidance is prevented (i.e., it advertises one attribute only). The opponent
has therefore an incentive to reduce the value of the attributes that are not
advertised, as they are not considered to be salient by the consumer in at
least one state of the world, making its strategy a profitable deviation. The
iteration of argument leads to the outcome in which firms design extreme
products and target marketing accordingly.
Lemma 2 and lemma 3 have got two noteworthy implications. First,
marketing is fully effective in equilibrium. That is, conditional on a firm
advertising attribute a, in the state of the world in which attribute a is con-
sidered to be salient, the consumer buys that firm’s product with probability
one. This implies that firm’s market shares are at least 1
2
in equilibrium.
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Second, firms’ equilibrium profits are 1
2
− ϕk - the same as those in the
benchmark case. The reasons are that, by the previous arguments, equilib-
rium costs are ϕk, market shares cannot exceed 1
2
in symmetric equilibrium,
and marketing is fully effective implying that market shares are at least 1
2
.
The economic message is that extreme tradeoff avoidance does not reduce
firms’ profits compared to the benchmark case, because products and mar-
keting strategies are designed in such a way that difficult choices and, as a
result, choice avoidance are prevented.
The next proposition characterizes the equilibrium.
Proposition 2 (Extreme Tradeoff Avoidance). Assume that costs are suffi-
ciently small. In every symmetric equilibrium firms advertise {a} with pos-
itive probability for all a ∈ I. Conditional on advertising {a} firms offer a
product on the technological frontier such that only attribute a has positive
value. Firms’ equilibrium profits are 1
2
− ϕk.
Besides having a strong impact on product design and marketing, trade-
off avoidance induces product differentiation even though preferences are
assumed to be homogeneous. The reason is that firms offer extreme prod-
ucts in equilibrium. If a firm does not include in its assortment a product
that shines in some dimensions, then the opponent can profitably deviate by
specializing in those dimensions and advertising accordingly. The number
of products offered with positive probability is A - one for each attribute.
In terms of consumer’s welfare, the offered products are worse than in the
benchmark case, because products are extreme and the consumer is endowed
with convex preferences.
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4.3 Moderate Tradeoff Avoidance: τ = 1
In this subsection I assume that the consumer is able to make at most one
tradeoff. An easy choice is therefore an extended choice problem ({x, y}, I)
such that |Tr({x, y}, I)| ≤ 1. As in the case τ = 0, there are no pure-strategy
equilibria and firms offer products on the technological frontier with positive
probability for the same reasons.
The next lemma characterizes the products that firms offer in symmetric
equilibrium. Denote by x˜a(a, b) and x˜b(a, b) the optimal values of xa and xb
that solve the maximization problem maxx∈X u|{a,b}(·) subject to
∑
a∈I xa ≤
k.
Lemma 4. Assume that costs are sufficiently small and let σ be a symmetric
equilibrium strategy. For all pair of distinct attributes a, b ∈ I there exists
an extended product (x,M) in the support of σ such that xa = x˜a(a, b),
xb = x˜b(a, b), and xc = 0 for any c ∈ I \ {a, b}.
Proof. Note that the interior solution to the problem maxx∈X u|{a,b}(·) sub-
ject to
∑
a∈I xa ≤ k is given by a vector z whose components are equal to
zero apart from za = z˜a(a, b) and zb = z˜b(a, b). Expected market shares in
symmetric equilibrium cannot exceed 1
2
. Since products offered with pos-
itive probability lie on the technological frontier, expected profits in sym-
metric equilibrium cannot exceed 1
2
− ϕk. Assume, by contradiction, that
either ya > z˜a(a, b) and yb < z˜b(a, b) or the other way around for any ex-
tended product (y,N) in the support of σ. Suppose that a firm deviates
to (x, {a, b}) such that xa = z˜a(a, b) −  and xb = z˜b(a, b) − , and xc = 0
for any c ∈ I \ {a, b} and  > 0. By the strict quasi-concavity of the re-
stricted utility function u|{a,b}(·), as long as  is sufficiently small (x, {a, b})
beats all extended products in S(σ) in the state of the world in which the
set of considered attributes is {a, b}. Hence, the deviation yields at least 1
2
market shares at a cost of ϕ(k− 2). However, this contradicts the fact that
symmetric equilibrium profits cannot exceed 1
2
− ϕk.
Lemma 4 says that firms offer with positive probability the utility-maximizing
products that maximize the restricted utility function u|{a,b} for any pair of
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distinct attributes a, b ∈ I. That is, under moderate tradeoff avoidance firms
still offer extreme products in equilibrium, as only two attributes are assigned
positive values for every product offered with positive probability. In the ap-
pendix I show that these products are the only products that are offered with
positive probability and that firms target marketing accordingly. That is,
only the pair of attributes to which positive value is assigned are advertised.
The next proposition characterizes the equilibrium under moderate trade-
off avoidance.
Proposition 3 (Moderate Tradeoff Avoidance). Assume that costs are suf-
ficiently small. In every symmetric equilibrium firms advertise the pair of
attributes a, b for all distinct a, b ∈ I with positive probability. Conditional
on advertising {a, b} firms offer a product on the technological frontier that
maximizes u|{a,b}(x). Firms’ equilibrium profits are 12 − ϕk.
The arguments of the proof are similar to those of proposition 2 with a
few substantial modifications. As an example, a key step is to understand
why offering a product like the ones offered in the equilibrium of proposition
2 is not optimal. Assume that firms play the equilibrium of proposition 3.
Suppose that a firm deviates to a product y that possesses only attribute
a (i.e., its value is k) and targets marketing accordingly. Consider the re-
alization of the equilibrium in which the opponent advertises the pair of
attributes a, b with a 6= b and offers the u|{a,b}(x)-maximizing product z. In
that realization precisely one tradeoff is generated, as ya > za, yb < zb, and
yc = zc for all c ∈ I \ {a, b}. Since the consumer is able to handle it, he con-
siders all attributes and chooses by maximizing u(x). By assumption, the
u|{a,b}(x)-maximizing product z yields higher unrestricted utility u(x) than
the extreme product y that possesses attribute a only. This implies that
in the state of the world in which the consumer considers attribute a only,
deviating yields less than all market shares. In the other state of the world
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(i.e., the one in which the set of considered attributes is determined by the
equilibrium strategy) it obtains zero market shares. This implies that the
deviation is not profitable independently of its cost, as overall it yields less
than 1
2
market shares.
By increasing the number of tradeoffs that the consumer is able to make
from zero to one, several things change in equilibrium. First, as discussed
above, product design and marketing are different. Firms offer more bal-
anced products in equilibrium and target marketing accordingly. Second,
the amount of product differentiation is strictly greater. In general, the
number of products offered with positive probability is
(
A
2
)
= A!
(A−2)!2! , which
is greater than A - the number of products offered with positive probability
under extreme tradeoff avoidance. The reason is that since the consumer is
able to make one tradeoff, more products can be designed that prevent com-
plicated choices relative to the case in which the consumer is able to make
zero tradeoffs. Third, in terms of welfare the offered product are still worse
than in the benchmark case, but more balanced and ‘closer’ to the welfare-
maximizing product x∗. On the contrary, firms’ profits are still those of the
benchmark case. This implies that the consumer’s sophistication level does
not have an effect on firms’ equilibrium profits, as far as extreme tradeoff
avoidance and moderate tradeoff avoidance are concerned. A second result
unaffected by the consumer’s degree of tradeoff avoidance is marketing ef-
fectiveness. Like under extreme tradeoff avoidance, under moderate tradeoff
avoidance marketing is fully effective for the same reasons.
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5 Exogenous Salience
The previously discussed results show that the products offered in equilib-
rium under extreme and moderate tradeoff avoidance are worse than the
welfare-maximizing product x∗. In this section I investigate whether forc-
ing the consumer to consider some attributes can improve their welfare. As
discussed above the consumer’s choice behaviour is irrational also when mar-
keting - and as a result attribute salience - is exogenously given. Therefore,
it is not obvious a priori whether competitive forces are able to achieve this
goal. Throughout this section I denote by M ⊆ I the non-empty set of con-
sidered attributes and xˆ ∈ arg maxx∈X u|M(x) subject to
∑
a∈I xa ≤ k the
technologically feasible u|M -maximizing product. Since marketing is irrele-
vant, I denote an extended product by (x, ·).
Proposition 4 (Exogenous Salience and Extreme Tradeoff Avoidance). As-
sume that costs are sufficiently small. If τ = 0, then in every symmetric equi-
librium firms offer (x, ·) on the technological frontier with positive probability
such that only the attributes in M have positive value. Firms’ equilibrium
profits are at most 1
2
− ϕk.
Proof. By the same arguments of the previous propositions, the products in
the support of the equilibrium have to lie on the technological frontier and,
therefore, equilibrium costs are ϕk. It clearly does not make sense for firms
to assign positive values to attributes outside M .
Assume that τ = 0. Let (y, ·) be a product in the support of σ and σ(y, ·)
the probability with which it is played. Expected profits are σ(y,·)
2
− ϕk,
because products offered with positive probability lie on the technological
frontier and induce at least one tradeoff at any comparison implying that an
extended product generates positive market shares only against itself. Since
for any (x, ·), (y, ·) ∈ S(σ), σ(x,·)
2
− ϕk = σ(y,·)
2
− ϕk, then σ(x, ·) = σ(y, ·) =
1
|S(σ)| . Deviating yields zero market shares, as either a tradeoff is induced or
the deviant product is beaten by a product in the support.
Proposition 4 says that whenever a set M of considered attributes is
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exogenously fixed and the consumer is not able to make tradeoffs at all, then
in equilibrium firms offer a product on the technological frontier, which is not
necessarily their most preferred one xˆ, by making equilibrium profits weakly
smaller than those of the benchmark case.
Proposition 5 (Exogenous Salience and Non-Extreme Tradeoff Avoidance).
Assume that costs are sufficiently small. If τ > 0, then in the unique sym-
metric equilibrium firms offer (xˆ, ·) with probability one. Firms’ equilibrium
profits are 1
2
− ϕk.
Proof. As for proposition 4, equilibrium costs are ϕk and attributes outside
M are assigned zero value. Assume that τ > 0. Existence is obvious, as devi-
ating yields zero market shares because either the set of considered attributes
is not calibrated or the deviant product is beaten by (xˆ, ·). I now check
uniqueness. Assume, by contradiction, that there are n > 1 distinct prod-
ucts (x1, ·), . . . , (xn, ·) in the support S(σ) such that for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
there exists a j ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {i} such that |Tr({xi, xj},M)| ≤ τ . Assume
WLOG that u|M(xi) ≥ u|M(xj) if and only if i < j. If u|M(xi) = u|M(xj)
for some i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, then xi = yj, a contradiction. Hence, assume
that u|M(xi) > u|M(xj) if and only if i < j. Consider the worst product
in the list (xn, ·). I now calculate the expected profits of (xn, ·) against σ.
Note that (i) if number of tradeoffs induced by comparing (xn, ·) with some
other product (xi, ·) with i 6= n is greater than τ , then the consumer chooses
nothing and (ii) if the number of tradeoff induced by comparing (xn, ·) with
(xi, ·) with i 6= n is smaller than or equal to τ , then the consumer does not
choose xn, because xi is u|M -superior to it. This implies that (xn, ·) yields
positive market shares only against itself. Hence, its expected profits against
σ are σ(x
n,·)
2
− ϕk. By assumption, there exists i˜ ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} such that
|Tr({xi˜, xn},M)| ≤ τ . Notice that the expected profits of (xi˜, ·) against σ
are σ(x
i˜,·)
2
+σ(xn, ·)+A−ϕk, where A ≥ 0 is the market shares that (xi˜, ·) ob-
tains against extended products in the support other than (xn, ·). Since both
(xn, ·) and (xi˜, ·) belong to the support of σ, then they must yield the same
expected profits against σ. That is, σ(x
n,·)
2
− ϕk = σ(xi˜,·)
2
+ σ(xn, ·) +A− ϕk
or, equivalently, −σ(xn,·)
2
= σ(x
i˜,·)
2
+ A, a contradiction. This implies that it
must be the case that |Tr({x, y},M)| > τ for any x, y ∈ S(σ). Assume,
by contradiction, that S(σ) is not a singleton. Let (x, ·) ∈ S(σ) \ {(xˆ, ·)}.
Since |Tr({x, y},M)| > τ for any (x, ·), (y, ·) ∈ S(σ), then an alternative in
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the support obtains positive market shares only against itself. But then it is
profitable to replace (x, ·) with a u|M -superior alternative (y, ·) by changing
at most two attributes at a time in such a way that at most one tradeoff is
induced, a contradiction. Hence, S(σ) is a singleton that contains (xˆ, ·).
Unlike proposition 4, proposition 5 says that if the consumer is able to
make at least one tradeoff, then firms offer their most preferred product in any
equilibrium by making equilibrium profits equal to those of the benchmark
case. An immediate implication of proposition 5 is that if the set of salient
attributes is set to be equal to the grand set of attributes I and the consumer
is able to make at least one tradeoff, then in the unique equilibrium firms
offer x∗, the welfare-maximizing product and firms are better off than in the
τ = 0 case.
The intuition behind these results is that as long as the consumer is able
to make at least one tradeoff, firms have an incentive to deviate towards the
utility-maximizing product in a Bertrand fashion by changing at most two
attributes at a time. The requirement that at most two attributes at a time
are changed is key, as it entails that at most one tradeoff is induced implying
that the consumer actively chooses at any deviation (i.e., choice avoidance
never occurs). This strategy allows firms to move along the technological
frontier and reach the optimal product in multiple steps. Note that the
higher the number of tradeoffs the consumer is able to make, the higher
the number of attributes that can be changed at any deviation towards the
optimum while preventing choice avoidance. This implies that the speed at
which the equilibrium can be reached (in terms of the number of deviations
needed to reach xˆ) is positively related with the number τ of tradeoffs the
consumer is able to make.
A policy implication is that a policy-maker interested in maximizing the
consumer’s welfare should not invest resources on the education of moder-
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ately unsophisticated tradeoff-avoiding consumers. Instead, the focus should
be on the regulation of marketing campaigns, as those typically concur in de-
termining attribute salience. If the policy-maker can somehow prevent firms
from manipulating attribute salience and influence what attributes are con-
sidered, then competitive forces are able to induce firms to offer the welfare-
maximizing product, as long as the consumer is able to make at least one
tradeoff.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this work I propose a market model in which I investigate the consequences
of consumers avoiding tradeoffs at complex problems. The contribution of
this paper is to illustrate that tradeoff avoidance has an effect on various
aspects of market competition including product design, marketing, welfare,
and product differentiation. In particular tradeoff avoidance induces firms
to offer extreme products and target marketing accordingly. The inability of
consumers to make tradeoffs reduces their welfare and induces firms to prod-
uct differentiate. As consumers become more sophisticated, firms design
more balanced products and the degree of product differentiation decreases
non-monotonically. The main result is that if consumers are able to make at
least one tradeoff, then the welfare-maximizing outcome can be achieved in
equilibrium, provided that attribute salience is exogenous. The policy impli-
cation is that policy-makers should focus more attention on the regulation
of marketing campaigns, which typically contribute to determine attribute
salience, than on the challenging task of educating moderately unsophisti-
cated tradeoff-avoiding consumers.
Below I acknowledge the main limitations of this paper and outline pos-
sible extensions. First, the proposed model is of quality-competition and the
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price is not explicitly modelled. This is clearly a limitation, as the price is
one of the most prominent attributes. Extending the model by incorporating
the price is non-obvious.
Second, while on the one hand I do not impose stringent assumptions
on the consumer’s utility function, on the other hand the cost structure and
the technological constraint are simple and rather specific. The reasons are
simplicity and, as explained in the introduction, the fact that I intended to
focus my attention on the consequences of the consumer’s choice procedure
leaving aside every other effect.
Third, the consumer’s sophistication level is exogenous. It would be inter-
esting to generalize the model by assuming that the consumer’s willingness
to make tradeoffs is the result of a maximization problem subject to cognitive
costs.9 This is left for future research.
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A Proofs
Proposition 2. The proof proceeds stepwise.
Step 1: equilibrium costs are ϕk.
Proof. The statement is equivalent to requiring that all products offered with
positive probability lie on the frontier. Assume the contrary. Let (x,M) ∈
S(σ) be an extended product such that x does not lie on the frontier. If (x,M)
is the only product in the support, then deviating to any Pareto-superior
product is profitable. Hence, assume that, on the contrary, (x,M) ⊂ S(σ)
and (z,N) is some other extended product in S(σ). I claim that deviating
to (y,M) is profitable, where ya = xa +  with  > 0 for some a ∈ I and
yb = xb for all b ∈ I \ {a}. The reason is that (i) (y,M) beats (x,M),
because y Pareto dominates x, and (ii) (y,M) does not do worse than (x,M)
against the other extended products (z,N) in the support. To see that (ii)
is true, let O ∈ {M,N, I} be the set attributes that the consumer considers.
I distinguish two cases.
Case (a): Assume that Tr({x, z}, O) = 0. If (x,M) beats (z,N), then x
Pareto dominates z as far as the attributes in O are concerned. Regardless
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of whether a ∈ O, (y,M) also beats (z,N). If (x,M) is indifferent to (z,N),
then xc = zc for all c ∈ O. This implies that (y,M) is either indifferent to
(z,N) or beats it. Finally, if (x,M) is beaten by (z,N), then deviating to
(y,M) cannot further reduce market shares.
Case (b): Assume that Tr({x, z}, O) > 0. The consumer postpones and
therefore the firm offering (x,M) obtains zero market shares. This implies
that deviating to (y,M) cannot further reduce market shares.
Since (y,M) beats (x,M) and (y,M) does not do worse than (x,M)
against the other extended products (z,N) in the support for any set O ∈
{M,N, I} of considered attributes, then (y,M) yields strictly greater market
shares than (x,M) against σ. As long as costs are sufficiently small, the
deviation is profitable, a contradiction.
Step 2: for all a ∈ I there exist an extended product (x,M) in the
support of σ such that xa = k and xb = 0 for any b ∈ I \ {a}.
Proof. This is lemma 2 in the main body.
Step 3: Let (x,M) ∈ S(σ). If xa = k and xb = 0 for any b ∈ I \ {a},
then M = {a}.
Proof. This is lemma 3 in the main body.
Step 4: equilibrium profits are 1
2
− ϕk.
Proof. By step 3, (x, {a}) ∈ S(σ), where xa = k and xb = 0 for any b ∈ I \
{a}. Note that (x, {a}) beats all the other extended products in the support
in the state of the world in which the set of considered attributes is {a}.
Hence, (x, {a}) yields at least 1
2
market shares. In symmetric equilibrium
market shares cannot exceed 1
2
. By step 1, equilibrium costs are ϕk. This
implies that equilibrium profits are 1
2
− ϕk.
Step 5: S(σ) = {(x, {a})|a ∈ I, xa = k, and xb = 0 for any b ∈ I \ {a}}.
Proof. By step 3, {(x, {a})|a ∈ I, xa = k, and xb = 0 for any b ∈ I \ {a}} ⊆
S(σ). In the other direction, assume, by contradiction, that S(σ) contains
some other extended product (x,M) different from the above. By step 3,
∃(x, {a}) such that xa = k and xb = 0 for any b ∈ I \ {a} for all a ∈ I. Note
that in the state of the world in which the set of considered attributes is
determined by σ, (x,M) yields zero market shares. Hence, consider the state
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of the world in which the set of considered attributes is M . If |M | = 1, then
(x,M) gets beaten in some realization of the equilibrium. If |M | > 1, then
either (x,M) gets beaten in some realization of the equilibrium or M is not
calibrated. Hence, (x,M) yields less than 1
2
market shares. By step 1, x lies
on the frontier. Hence, it yields less than 1
2
− ϕk profits, which contradicts
step 4.
Step 6: symmetric equilibria with the above properties exist.
Proof. Assume that extended products in the support of σ are uniformly
distributed. I now check for profitable deviations.
Case (i): marketing is optimal. Deviating can only reduce market shares
as at least one tradeoff is induced in some realization of the equilibrium.
Case (ii): products are optimal. Assume that a firm decreases attribute
a and increases attribute b (along the frontier or below it). Then, it loses
with probability one in the state of the world in which the set of considered
attributes is determined by σ. Moreover, it loses with probability one against
(x, {a}) such that xa = k and xc = 0 for all c ∈ I \ {a} and fails to beat
(y, {b}) such that yb = k and xc = 0 for all c ∈ I \{b} in the state of the world
in which attribute b is considered. Hence, it generates less than 1
2
market
shares.
Case (iii): other deviations. The arguments of step 5 apply.
This concludes the proof.
Proposition 3. Denote by x˜a(a, b) and x˜b(a, b) the optimal values of xa and xb
that solve the maximization problem maxx∈X u|{a,b}(·) subject to
∑
a∈I xa ≤
k. The first step is similar to that of proposition 2 and, therefore, its proof
is omitted.
Step 1: equilibrium costs are ϕk.
Step 2: for all pair of distinct attributes a, b ∈ I there exists an extended
product (x,M) in the support of σ such that xa = x˜a(a, b), xb = x˜b(a, b), and
xc = 0 for any c ∈ I \ {a, b}.
Proof. This is lemma 4 in the main body.
Step 3: Let (x,M) ∈ S(σ). If xa = x˜a(a, b), xb = x˜b(a, b), and xc = 0 for
any c ∈ I \ {a, b}, then M = {a, b}.
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Proof. Let (x,M) be an extended product in S(σ) such that xa = x˜a(a, b),
xb = x˜b(a, b), xc = 0 for any c ∈ I \ {a, b}, and M 6= {a, b}. I now show
that (x,M) does not yield greater market shares than (x, {a, b}) against σ.
I distinguish various cases.
Case (i): M ∩ {a, b} = ∅. It is immediate to see that (x, {a, b}) yields
higher market shares than (x,M) at the same cost.
Case (ii): M ⊂ {a, b}. Assume WLOG M = {a}. In the state of the
world in which the set of considered attributes is determined by σ, (x, {a})
cannot do better than (x, {a, b}). Hence, consider the other state of the
world. Assume first that xa ≤ za, for some (z,M ′) in the support. Note
that (x, {a, b}) yields strictly higher market shares than (x, {a}), as while
(x, {a, b}) beats all the other extended products in the support, (x, {a}) fails
to do so. Next, assume that xa > za for all (z,M
′) in the support. Then,
(x, {a}), as (x, {a, b}) does, yields at most the whole market with probability
one. Hence, it cannot yield higher market shares than (x, {a, b}).
Case (iii): {a, c, d} ⊆M , where c can be equal to b. While (x, {a, b}) beats
(y,N) in the state of the world in which the set of considered attributes is
{a, b}, (x,M) fails to do so in the state of the world in which the set of
considered attributes is M , as M is not calibrated. In the other states of
the world (x,M) cannot do better than (x, {a, b}). Hence, (x, {a, b}) yields
strictly greater market shares than (x,M) at the same cost, which is the
desired result.
Step 4: equilibrium profits are 1
2
− ϕk.
Proof. By step 3, (x, {a, b}) ∈ S(σ), where such that xa = x˜a(a, b), xb =
x˜b(a, b), xc = 0 for any c ∈ I \ {a, b}. Note that (x, {a, b}) beats all the
other extended products in the support in the state of the world in which
the set of considered attributes is {a, b}. Hence, (x, {a, b}) yields at least 1
2
market shares. In symmetric equilibrium market shares cannot exceed 1
2
. By
step 1, equilibrium costs are ϕk. This implies that equilibrium profits are
1
2
− ϕk.
Step 5: S(σ) = {(x, {a, b})|a, b ∈ I with a 6= b, xa = x˜a(a, b), xb =
x˜b(a, b), and xc = 0 for any c ∈ I \ {a, b}}.
Proof. By step 3, {(x, {a, b})|a, b ∈ I with a 6= b, xa = x˜a(a, b), xb = x˜b(a, b), and xc =
0 for any c ∈ I \ {a, b}} ⊆ S(σ). In the other direction, assume the contrary.
That is, there is some (x,M) in S(σ) different from the above. By step
3, ∃(x, {a, b}) such that xa = x˜a(a, b), xb = x˜b(a, b), and xc = 0 for any
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c ∈ I \ {a, b} for all distinct pairs a, b ∈ I. In the state of the world in
which the set of considered attributes is determined by σ, (x,M) yields zero
market shares. Hence, consider the state of the world in which the set of
considered attributes is M . If |M | ≤ 2, then (x,M) gets beaten in some
realization of the equilibrium. If |M | > 2, then either (x,M) gets beaten in
some realization of the equilibrium or M is not calibrated. Hence, (x,M)
yields less than 1
2
market shares. By step 2, x lies on the frontier. Hence, it
yields less than 1
2
− ϕk profits, which contradicts step 4.
Step 6: symmetric equilibria with the above properties exist.
Proof. Assume that the extended products in the support are uniformly dis-
tributed. I now check for profitable deviations.
Case (i): marketing is optimal. Deviating can only reduce market shares
as either at least one tradeoff is induced or the offered product is beaten in
some realization of the equilibrium.
Case (ii): products are optimal. Assume that a firm decreases attribute
a and/or attribute b (along the frontier or below it) and increases some
other attributes in the set M . Then, it loses with probability one in the
state of the world in which the set of considered attributes is determined
by σ. Moreover, it loses with probability one against (x, {a, b}) such that
xa = x˜a(a, b), xb = x˜b(a, b), and xc = 0 for any c ∈ I \ {a, b} and fails to beat
(y, {d, e}) such that {d, e} ⊂ M , xd = x˜d(d, e), xe = x˜e(d, e), and xc = 0 for
any c ∈ I \ {d, e} in the state of the world in which the considered attributes
are a and b. Hence, it yields less than 1
2
− ϕk profits.
Case (iii): other deviations. The arguments of step 5 apply.
This concludes the proof.
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